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STATE OF MAINE.
,,

Sl1preme Judicial OouTt,
UUMBER.LAND COUNTY.

WESTERN DISTRICT, LAW TERM, 1876.

1,HE 1::>'£ATE OF MAINE

vs.
TH:R MAINE CENTR-4.L RAILROAD COMPANY.

ARGUMENT

J3y L. A.

FOR

1£~rnHY,

TUE

STATE,

Attomey General.

The action is brought to recover the State tax assessed April 1, 1875, upon the defendants' franchise,
under the Act of March 4, 1874, printed in the appendix. The declaration is in debt. as authorized by
Chapter 115 oJ the Laws oE 1876, anc1 closely follows
the Statute of 1874 imposing the tax. The case shows
that the t.ax was regularly assessed, and that all necessary acts were done by the State officers to fix the

defendants' liability, if they rould be ma.de liable :it all.
The counsel m:tke no c1ucstion. except the one pre::muted h.)' thuir brief ~tn.tement in their plea, tlrnt the
• 'tatutc imposing the ta.-x impairs the obligation of a
contract. anrl il:l therefore void, being in conflict with
the Constitution of tlic United States.
The defcnrln,nt~' counsel have my thanks, and the
thanks of the court. l trust. for their cordinl assistance
in bringing this vital question before the court, singly
and unembarra:,;;o;cd by technirnl objcctioru:. The State.
also, in this cai;;e, has no wish to collect an unconstitutional tax. nor to put t.his clefemlant. corporation at any
disaclvnntage in the a~sertion of alleged chnrtere,1 rif!bts
or immu111t1cs. Apprehending that constitutional questions might arise, and bei11g willing to meet them, the
~!ate Government has waived the ~ununttry procc~s in
the collection of this part of its revenues. and comes
into this court with its demnud and joins issne on the
clefemlnnts' plcn.

lt is t.rne tlrnt the original charters of most if not all
of the original railroad co111panics, now consolidated
into the Mn inc Cenlral. arnl of other existing compnnies, provided for nnotlll'l' noel different mode of
t.ax11tion. as set. forth in the cxtrnct.s from the charter
of the AtHlroscoggin and Kennebec, printed in the
case, to wit; a municipal taxation of the shares to the
owner in the town where Im resided. Iu procci<s of
time, and the cuurse of railrot1cl truu:sactions, the shares
have been passing from thA Ol'igino.1 owners. citizens of

Maine, in to the ha.nds of raili·oad kings in other States,
by whom they are held in large blocks for purposes of
profit, ilirectly or indirectly.
The Ma.te at last found itself protecting, by its law::\
and jts conrts, immense corporate interests, representing many millions of property, without receiving their
fair shares of contributions for the r.;upport of the laws
and the c~urts. To remedy this injustice, the Act. of
187 4 wa.s passed, taking off the tax on the few scattered
Maine Stockholders, and assessing the whole tax
directly on the franchise, ns repre::>enting a11 the shn.res
wherever held. 'rhe State was lenient and liberal in it
all. It only assesserl upon the ma.rket value of the
shares- what they would sell for. From this were fleducted all real estate and other property of the corporation subject to any tn.sation elsewhere. The Act
is eminently just and equitable. It will tend to equalize
the public burdens, and restore to the State. revenue~
of which she ha.., heretofore been deprived.
The defendimts. by their plea, set up a. contract by
which, a~ they say, the State has bound itself never to
alter the mode o[ taxation from the taxation of shares
to the holcler, and that this contrn.ct is protected b,v
the United States Constitution; a.ml they will invoke
those well lrnown deci'5ions of the Supreme Court of
the United States, whicli have become the entrenchments of corponitiorn; in their re::.;istance to State control. This raises at once the question of the constitutionality of the State law.

The presumption is, that the Act of March 4, 187 4,
is constitutional. It is a strong presumption, only to
be overcome by the clearest reasoning nnd most conclusive anthorities. All the judges and writers agree
upon this. Chief Justice Mar:;bnll, in the Fletcher v.
Peck case, said the judges must be convinced, and
" the conviclion must be clenr and strong.,. Judge
Washington, in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 1Vheaton, 270,
declared that if he rested his opinion on no other ground
than a donht as to the unconstitutionality of the law.
that alone would be a satisfactory vindication o[ his
opinion in favor of its constitutiona,lity. Chief Justice
Mellen of our own court, in Lunt's case, 6 Me., 413.
says. ''All acts of the Legislature are prcsmned to be
constitutionnl; and the court will never pronounce a
stntnte to be otherwii:;e, unles~ in a case where the
point is free rrom all doubt."
This being tbe presumption, the burucn is on Lhe
clcfondants to establish the proposition necessary to
their defense, that there exists between the State aud
this particulm· <lefondaut corporation, in relation to
taxation, a contract which i:-; within the clause of the
United State~ Constitution, prohibiting n. State from
pn::.sing any faw impniring the obligation 0£ contracts;
ancl which th(;' Act of ~farch .+, 187.J., does impair; or
in other word:-;, that th<' Act of 187 4 rel'lcimls a contl'act
between the f.itate arnl the clefcndant., which the State
h:id no power to rescincl.
Thev must establish the contract; they must estab1isli itR in·C'vocn.ble <'.lrn.racter ; the,v mui:;t C$tablish it~

impairment. They must do all this folly, clearly. nnd
heyontl all cloubt.
The ca~e shows that the lines of railroad now owuecl
and operated bs the defendant co1·poratiou, t.he .Maine
Centrnl. were originally ownccl and operated by five
c1iffe1·ent corporations, to wit; the line from Danville to
W ::i.terville. by the Androscoggin aucl Kennebec, incorporated in 1845 ; the line from Waterville to Bangor,
by the Penobscot an<l Kennebec. incorponitcd in 1845 ;
the lino from Portlnnd to Augusta, by the Kennehee
ancl Portland, incorporate<l in 1R3fi; the line from Augusta to Skowhegan, by the Nomerset and Kennebec,
incorpora.ted in 18+8 ; an<l the line from Leech; Junction
to Farmington, by the Androscoggin, incorpornted in
184:8. The line from Porthmcl to Augusta, in 1862,
came into the possesRion of a new col'poration Ol'ganizerl
by the bondholclers, and calle<l the Portland ancl Kennebec. Tho Farmington line in 18G5 ca.me into the
hands of n, new corporation, organized hy the bondholders nnd called the Leeds mul Farmin@:ton.
<.

In September 1862, acting uncler tbe Act of April L
1856, printed in the case, two of these corporations,
the Anclroscoggin and Kennebec, a.ud the Penobscot
and Kennebec, were by virtue of saicl Act, and theil'
contract urnler it. con::iolidnted in a. new corporation
C<illecl tlie" Maine Central." Again, in November, 187 4:,
by vil'tue of the Act of Febnrn.ry 2G, 1873, and a. contract in pursuance thereof, the other three companies
con.lescetl with Lhe first two and formed the pre~enL
Maine Central Railroad Company, the clefendant in

this case, and the <lcfendant that must ::;how the ·necessary C'ontrnct with itself.
All the chartc•rs arnl nmen<lments thereto. either by
general or Hpecial b \Y of these variouR companies. and
all Acts of the Lcgi-;lat me urnlcr which they consolidated into tl1e Maine Central Railroa<l Uompany. were
granle<1 anc1 enacted Rnhsecp1cnt to the general law,
f'hap. 50~ of Lnm; of 1831~ pri11te<l in appemlix "C."

J preRnme it will be admitted that this Act of 1831,
in all its <'ntircty. wai'l a part of all those charters,
amendments nud acts, al' 111uch a<; if it Imel been
Hpe<'ifically inHertccl arnl rc-cnaetNl in each. The proposition harcllv needs nrgnmcnt.
The Ad. it.self s:tYR,
w
.
'" in the same manner a~ if nn express provision to that
effect 'vcrc contninecl in the clrnrter." If authorities
are cll'Hire<l, I "·ould refer lo the opinion of J uclgc F ield,
in Tomlin..:;011 v. ,Jessup. 1GWallace, -1:5-t who says.'' The
provi:.:ion:.: of that hlw (a similar one in South Carolina)
therefore, corn;titutecl the condition upon which every
<'barter of ;t corporation Hnb:-;eq11entl.r granted was held,
nud upon whid1 every modification was made. They
were as operative, ancl ns much n, part of the clrn.rler
and :uncnc1mcnt, as if incorpora.tccl into them. See nlso
~

Tomlinson o. Branch, Hol,11oke Oo . v. Lyman
am1 .iJ.Iiller LL 1'/te State, in the same volume.
caseH

This stipulation, hcing in effect, in all the charters
n.ml nets in rclntion to tlicl'le companieR, gives the L egis1atnre full power n,t any time to "amend, alter or
repeal" all or any part of them. without impairing any

obligation of any contrnct. ln fact, the State rt>scrves
the right to rescind whatever the corporntion claimR to
be a contract. This power of repenl an<l nmendment
goes to the root of every clause. The clause found at
the close of the 15th section, printed un l?age 3, and
which is in mm;t of the clrn.rtcr1;, viz: •·But no other ta.x
th:u1 is herein provitle<l shall be levietl oe assessed on
::;aid corporation, or any of it:; p1·ivileges or franchises "-and nll other clauses in reh.Ltiou to taxation,
can he rescinde1l at the pleasure of the Legi$lature.
'rliis propo"Sition i::; folly sustained by the authorities
already cite<l, especially the case of 'Tomlinson v.
Jessup. J udgc Field says, in the opinion, ·' 'I'he power
reserved to the :-;t:tte by the Act of 184:1 anthorizecl
any change in the coutmct. :l.S it originally existed, or
as subseq ucntly mo<l ifiecl, or its entire revocation. The
origimtl corporators or :;;ubseq uent. i:;tockholclers took
their interest8 with the kno1vledge of this power, and
of the pos:;ibi1ity of its exercif!e at any tiu1c in the <fo~
cretio11 of the Legislature." See, also, We11/ 1risconsin
R. R. Co. 11. Supervisors, 35 Wi.s., 257, Union Im-

provement Co. v. The Commonwealth.

(if)

Pa. 8t. R ..

HO. bot11 of whid1 were casf>~ of the jrnpoRition of a
tn,:x in Rpite of an allegerl charter excm.ption.
The Mn.ine Central Railro:ul Company, to convince
the court thitt they have :m inepealablc contract, unaffect.etl by the Act. of 1831, must make it clear that
they are within the exception iu the act: that in their
case there is·· an express limitation or provision to tile
conh'a.ry.''

The onl.v places anywhere rn the whole range of
chartNs, amendment~. and acts concerning these roads
that I have been able to fimt where the language will
even atlmit of an argument that it i::i "nn express limitation or provision to the contnu.v,'' is the couclu<ling
phm:-;e in the 17th sections of the chartet·s of the original Arnlroscoggin nncl Kennebec. and Penobscot ancl
Kennebee Companie;:;, as follows : .. This charter shall
''not. be revoked, annnllecl, altered. limitecl or restrn.ined
" without the com;ent or the corporation, except by
·• cl ne proces:; o.f law."

language is strong, perhaps. but it is not the
langunge of the exception of the stn.tute. It makes
no reference to the ~tatnte. It. does not <lechre in
terms tha.t the statute shall uot apply.
Thi~

This langnage, howeve1·, is not found in any other
net or ch:lrtcr of any of those compnnies. On the
other lrnrnl, by the law::i of lSG·L chap. 238, appendix
'· E,'' chap. 2G3, appen<lix '· F"' the State mnde a firmer
grip on the Leech; nnc1 Farmington. and to some extent
on the Portland a.n<l Kcuncl)ec, the new corporations
formed b.v the bondholders on foreclosing their mort-

Aud yet it would not be enough for the defendants
to show clearly nncl strongly that all these five corporations were within the exceplion; that they every one
hnll immunity in the matter of taxation. They are to
convince the court that the Maine Central Railroad
Company hns thii:; r.h:utered immunity.

Suppose the conclnding phrase of the 17th sections of
the charters of the Androscoggin and Kennebec, ancl
P enobscot and Kennebec cli<l come within the exception . ancl cli.cl constitute an immnnity for each of the8e
compames. I believe it i8 the only chuse the clefenrlants can a::i:rnme to rely on. Their task, then, is to convince the court. that this little leaven of exemption has
leavened the whole lnmp of a.II five road;-;- has passed
into all the cbnrters. an<l into a.II the Acts; that it wn.;.;
in the Act of April L 1856. consolilfating the lir~t two
roads. and in tlte Act of 1873, consolid<1ting tue firRt
two imd t.!Je last three into the present Maine Centrnl.
'rhey have to do this with all the pre:mmptions n.nc1
rules of construction agaimit them. lu cou:-1truing chat·ter::; ancl grants of corpomte powerR nn<l franchises, all
doubts must. be ngninst the corporation and in favor of
the 8tate. Especially is :-;nch the rnle where a corporation claims exemption from taxatioll, '• than which,"
sayR .Juilge Fields, in 1'ornlinson v. ,Jessup. ··!lien.! il:l
no subject over which it is of gee:iter moment. for the
8tate to pre;-;erve its powe1·." All the case:-: hold tha.t a
surrender of the i:;overeign power of t:txation i~ never
to be iuforrecl. It must be cliRtinctly, unequivocally
aucl directly expre:o:;sed. In the words oE Judge Davis
in Bailey ·v. JJfagwi·re. 2~ Wrtll. 215. "'l'lte language
usen must lenve no room fo1· controver:;_v."
.Now let us examine the Act or 185G. If the Legislature ha.cl intended to exclude the Act of 1831 from
this Act, it would have said so in tenu::;. Legislatures
are to he judged by their worns only. 'l'hey must not
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only mean a. thiug, but they must say they mem1 it.
If they meant to limit the operation ot' the Act of 1831,
upon the Act of 1856, they were obliged to make an
expres:; limitation, a.n<1 make it in terms. I cannot
fi.nt1 anywhere in the Act such express limitation, nor
even an impliecl limitation. Section 4 of the Act was
printecl in the bod.v of the case at the sugge~t.ion of the
clefcmlants, perhaps as showing the best basis of n.
<'ln im of exception or exclu:;ion. It says, '· the new
corporation shall lrnve all the powen;, privileges and
imnrnnit.ies possessecl by each," of the old, but it does
not say t11at it shall have them exempt from the operation of the genenil law then on the Statute book, the
Act o[ 1831. There i:-> no prohibition of Legislative
action upon the franchise of the new corporation. The
proviso is not against annulling the new corporation.
Jt rehtei:; solely to !.he old corporation:;. It keeps them
in existence for certain purposes, but su;o;pencls the
enjoyment of their immunitie8 until r-;11ch time as ma.y
be necessary for their creditor~' proi·ection.

If the Legislature bacl meant the Act of 1856 to
have the i;ame cs:emption as defendant:;' claim for the
charters of 1845, it. \vould have used the same terms.
It woul<l have provi<1et1 that tbe powers aml immunities
of the old "should be po:'lses::ietl by the new," arnl ·'should
not be revokecl, annulled. altered, limited or restraine<l
without its consent." The Legislature didn't say it and
didn't mean it, but it is no matter how much they meant
it, if they rlidn't say it. There must be an expression
a.~ well as an intention.

11

'l'he Maine Central Railroa<l Company of that cfo.~r
\va,s not merely the Androscoggin & Kennebec tJlus the
Penobscot & Kennebec. It wns not a revival nor cont.inuntion of corporations. In the very terms of the
Act it wa8 11. new corporation. lt was to ta.ke a new
and different name. It wns to have <'L new Board of
Dfrectors. It wa:-1 a different corporation aml was to
have an in<lepenclent existence, for by the language of
the fourth ::;ection, the olrl corporations are made to
continue their own existence in an attenuated form.
It was necessarily a 1lifferent and separate corporation,
for. by the 5th section, the rights, franchises, &c., of
the two original corporations are transferred to it. The
langnage is, " they shall be clccmecl to be tr:rnsferred
to, ancl veste<l in such new corporation." The Act all
through treats it n.!'l ne\Y corporation, .~ml not the remoclelling of olcl ones.
rrhis new corporation derived its existence from the
only source that could give it life.-the Legislature.
No net::; of the two prior companies coulll have th0
least effect in creating it. No tnmsferR of Iranchi:-;e
are recognizet1 by t.lie law until the Legislature grants
perm1sR1on. This new corporation began its existence
the 28th day of October, A. n. 1862, but the Role :<onrcc
of, :tnd 1Luthority for its existence. wa.s t,he Act of 1856.
That net macle its being, possible. It was, while it
lived, the very breath of its nostrils. A repeal of that
act would ha.ve clissol ved it. 'I'he franchise of the new
corporation was not conferred upon it by the ohl companies. It was confened by the Legislatnre. U may

l:l

have a similar charter to tho:::;e of the others, but it has
it from the Legislature, not from any agreement.
The two prior corporations, hy their n.grecment of
18G2. accepted the act of 1856. They, in effect, surrern1erecl their franchise, tlmt it might be conferred on
a new corponttion, covering both roa<1s. '!'here was
no other wny the.v could tmusfcr it to another body.
If t.hey were through with it, it hac1 to go back to the
Legi-;lature to be Lorn aga.in. The new corporation
was a new birth, this time without the sin of exemption from taxation.
This franchise so ref'eivel1 is certainl.v snbject to the
general ln.w on the Sla.tute book at the time it was confen·e<l. 'rhis seem-: a plaiu proposition. an<l it is fnlly
supported b_v <tt1tho1·it.y. In State -v. Sher·man, 22 Obio,
Htate Re., 41 L it wns helcl tlrnt <~ trnnsfer of a franchise
is in 1cga1 effe<'t a ::;urrcnclcr to the Legislature, ancl a.
grant by the Legislature o{ a, simihir charter to the
transfereeH, nml the new grnnt is ~ubject to the constit.ution arnl laws in fol're at the time it was marle, in spite
of auy exemptions when the franchise was first grante<l.
'rhc court l'IH_r, "It ( t.he charter) must pass througb
legislative harnh.i before it can fake life in <l. new organization," which is ju:-:t my proprn:;ition. In that ca.c:;e
the general lnw wai; iu the <'onstitntion: bnt a ltiw upon
the general :::>tatute book wonkl be within the same

principle.
A chemical ill nstrntion occurs to me. Hy<ll'ogen an<l
Oxygen, each, claims an exemption from the law 0£
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gravitation, being lighter than air; but when they are
combiner! in certain proportions they form a new substance, water, which is under full subjection to the general law. The~e old companies, with their claims of
exemptions. went into the Legishtive crucible, to combine ancl come out a new organization, r;ubject to the law.
I3ut this is not all: for. as if to still further free itself from an exception ::;o obnoxiou~ to the people. this
new organization itself went into the Legislative crucible, there to combi11e with three other corporations,
ha,ving no taint. of the exception. and with them receive(1 from the Legislatme a. new life. The Act of
J 873, anCI the contract made nuder it, Nov. 16. 1874,
had the legal effect, according to the principle heretofore contender1 for ancl the case of State v. Sherman
before cited. to surren<1er the chartei:s of the then four
roads and receive a grant of one franchise for all.
By the terms of the Act, the four roa<1:;,-t.be Maine
Central. the Portland and Kennebec, the Leeds and
Farmington, the ~omerset n.n<l Kenuebec,-are permitted ··to consolidate into one corporation.'' By the
5t.h article of the consolidation agreement, the 5th, 6th,
7th and 8th sections of the Act of 1856 are made to
apply to the new corporation ··in the same mmrner and
to the same extent as they apply to a new consolidated
corporat.ion." The Act also adopts the Act of 1856,
so far as applicable.
By these ::lection1:1 1:10 adopted and made <L part of the
new consolidation, ·' the rights and franchises " of the

1-1

Maine Central, as well as the other roads, ''are transferrecl to and vested in the new corporation."
This new consofofated company has the same name
as one of its cou::;titnents. bnt it has a new grnnt of
franchise. 'rite olcl company owned and opern.teCl a
road from Danville to Bangor only. The new company
owns lines of railroml li·om Portland, at one extremity
of the State, to Farmington in one dil'ection to
Skowhegan in another, and to Bangor in another. It
posse~ses property to the amount. of nine or ten millions, twice as much aR the old Maine Central had. It
manages all the:-;e lines and controls all this property under one franchise, not under four. It has one government and one trea:mry. All its earnings from Bangor to
Augusta, Skowhegan, Farmington and Portland are
received and held by oue company under one charter.
1t was no partnership that was formed, but a consolidation ; not a confederation, but a nation. The foLu'
franchises were tru,nsferred to a common successor, and
became one franchise of one company. To quote the
Ohio Court, they passed through legislative hands and
took life in a new organization.

lt is this franchise that the

~t.:ite has taxed.

It is
the ta.-x upon thiR franchise a..:; enjoyed on the first da.y
of April. 1875. that we now n:::k of thi::: 11eiencfo.nt corporation. It is a single ta.~ upon n single franchise.
There i1o; but one living active frm1chise to assess; the
otberH are surrendered or in suspension. Tt is not a
tax upon the property of the compa,ny; as wa8 tbe t.rx:
in the cases cited in the 15th Wal lace. The Governor
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and Council were not to hunt up property an<l :;eparate
it into classes to be taxetl or not taxetl. They were
to tax the franehise, one ancl inrlivi:;ible.
Out of all the lines of railroa<l now owned by this
def euc1:rnt corporation. ex.ten<l ing from Portland to
Angnsta. 8kowhegan, Farmington aud Bangor, onl,Y
that part from Danville to Bangor was ever cln,imed
at a.ny time to be within the exception. nnc1 so exempt
from the laws. All the 1·cst of those lines. when built,
were confessec1I.v subject to Legislative control. The
clefencla11t8 woul<l have us helievc thnt the allege<1
exemption of pnrt, :tn exemption ::;o contrnry to our
n:ttural sense of right. :':O contrary to the achnittccl principles of lnw. Luis been Rilently cxtcnrled to the other
lines, so that. like the geni in the Arabian Nights, a
little clause in the charter of two feeble ron<l8, has expanded until a powerful corpora,tion. combining five
roads, n.lmost spanning the Sta,te with it.s iron lines, anrl
hearing up with its franchise nea.dy ten millions of
property, is envelopecl in its folcls, and nncler its protection defies the sovereignty of the people.

I know the logical power a.ml pen•nasive eloquence
of the clistiuguished counsel. hut he ca,nnot establish,
to the clear convirtion of the court, a proposition so
startling in it.s statement and RO ruinous in it8 consequen<'eR.
I have eudea.vorecl to show tha.t. the Act of 1831
takes this present Maine Central Rn.ilroad Company
out of the pale of those decisious of the Supreme
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Cot•rt of the United States which are so often quoted
iu support 0£ corporate immunities. It seems clear
thn.t they cn.nnot apply to this ta.x, nor to this corporation. The Legislature, however, has not simply taxed
this corporation, but has, in its wisdom, taxed all railroad corporations, even though some may come within
t.he pale. In this it has only voiced the sentiment of
the people, and hence I may be justified, as attorney
for the people. in going further, and contending that
the rights 0£ the people of the State, over their own
corporations, ought not to be prejudiced in any case
by those decisions. In cloing this I will only present
a few summarily stated propositions, more to <tpprise
the court of the position taken by the State in all cases
than because necessary to the argument in this cause.
A writer in the American Law Review, suggests that
if the court in the Dartmouth College case could have
had the light since shed upon the history of the clause
in question, by the later publication of the Madison
papers a.nd the debates, it wottlrl not have fallen into
such a theory. That. history seem~ to be this:

In the famous ordinance of 1787 for the Northwestern Territory, pasi;;ed by Congress J uly 11, there
was this restriction respecting laws affecting contracts :
"No law ought ever to be made or h:tve force in sn.id
"territory, that shall in any manner whatever, inter" fere with, or n.ffect privttte contracts or engagements,
"bona. :fide and without frau<l, previously formed."
This clause clearly referred only to private contracts
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or rlebts, anfl had no reference to public debts or obligations.

In the Constitutional Convention, August 28, of the
same yen.r, Mr. King movecl to insert t.he ic1entica1 clause
n.mong the prohibitions on States. In the clebn.te on
this proposition there was no sug_gei;;tion b.Y anybody
that it appliecl to public contract:-:;. There was no
thonght tbn.t it a:ffectecl the Sovereignty of a Btate over
its own corporations a,nil over its owu revenues.
The sentiment of the cunvention. however, seemed to
be iigainst even this, for Mr. Rutlerlge's i;;ubstitute of
expost facto la,w, w:ts carried b.v seven States to two.
When it was <liscovered that. ·· expost facto" oniy ap·
plierl to criminal matters. Mr. Gcrr.v marle an effort
to externl the prnbibition to civil cases. but was solidly
voterl clown. Suhsequently, in September, on motion of
Mr. '\Tilson. it is thought, the words, '' or law impairing
the ohlip:ation of contracts." were put. in.
Int.he light of the:-;e proceedings. it cannot be believed
that the convention intenclecl. by the last amen<lment,
auy grenter prohibition to Lhe Statel'l than that. they lrn,cl
so strongly vote<l clown so Roon hefore. Hn,ving rejecLetl
Mr. Gerry's motion unanimousl.v, it is incrN1ib1e that it
now meant such an inroacl upon the people's rights.
Wilson was brecl in tbe t->cotch civil law, anc1 the language usen by him was evidently drawn from that
code. ·rhe terrn " oblign.tion 0£ contracts" i8 the terse
English equivalent of the latin "obligatio ex contractu," which in the Roman Ja,w signified a private
;,

18

debt or express promii-;e, and hnil no reference to public
duties or obligatiomt The Romans never externled the
term to matter~ of Sta.te. The convention, in nsiug the
same term, never mcn.nt it to be extenrlecl heyontl
privnte <lehts.

It should be borne in minrl, too, that the clause was
not a transfo1· of power from the St:itc to the ~a.tional
Government, so that it wns still left tn the people to
be wielrled in nnother form. So far as it goeR it is a.
limitation upon sovereignty. ':Vhen the people in their
State Conventions arlopted the constitution with that
simple phrase in, they never dreamec1 they were so
limiting themselves in their sovereignty that their
legislatnreR conlrl barter awn.y their control over corporations an<l their right to raise revenue~.
The people of Maine clo not admit that they ever
gave tlte Legislature or any department of the State
~overnment., authority to bind them to an eternal surrencler of any part of their sovereignty, 01· their power
to compel a.11 classes to contribute their share to the
public burdens, which is that pa.rt of their sovereignty
most essential to them to preserve.
Louis XIV arrogantly exclnimed, ·'I n.111 the State."
Buch was the the theory of the fourlnl monarchs, but
even tbcy held tbc sovereignty for the people. ln
republics like ours, sovereignty is vested in no officet·.
in no clepartmeut. The three departmenhl are createcl
to ndminister the government, not to possess it. Combined, they cmmot cl iminish oue jot or tittle of the
powers of the people, nor enlarge by a hair's breadth

their own power~. 'rhey cannot aboli~h the State of
Maine, nor any pa.rt of it-nor tiny department of its
govcrnment-nol' change the form of its government
-11or in n.ny wa,y abriLlge a, particle of its sovereignty.
The State i:-; over all and above all, departments, officers,
citizens and corporations.
8tate Courts have resisted any infringement of the
right~ o.f the people, and it is not now claimed thnt the
Legis1a.turc can barter away the police power. or the
power of eminent donrn.in . Tlw1·pe v. R. & B. R.

R. Go., '27 Vt., 149. State v. Intoxicating Liqu01·s,
115 AI((ss., 153. Judge Uoolcy says on thii:; point,
"lt would seem to be the prevailing opinion. and one
·· bnsed on sound reason, tlrnt the Sta.te conlcl not barter,
" or in any manner abridge or weaken any of tlrnse
·· essential powcrl'i which a.re inherent in all govern" mrnts. rm<l the existence of which, in full vigor, is
•· important to the well being of organized Rociety;
'' ancl that an.v contracts to that en<l, heiug without
·'authority, cannot lie cnforcc<l urnler the provi::;ion of
''the national constitntion now unrler conRitlerntio11."
ln the case ~t.n tc v. Noyes, in this Htate, it wns a<lmittecl that the Legii:;lat11re cou lil not irrevocably barter
awa.Y the police power of the :-itate.
The power of ta.xntion, however, is a~ comp1etely
nn attribute of sovereignty anrl as essentia.1 tu the existence of organizerl souiety as either tbn.t of police or
eminent domain. All political and legal writers so declare. and all who reflect upon the subject must <Ldmit

it.
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Govemments are ei:;sential to human happiness, and
yet such i::; the selfishness of human nature, that without tbis power, nniversal, inherent and unceasingly
pre~ent in the govemment, it cannot exist fo1· a day.
To suspend the power for a single clay is to di~solve
ROCiety.
It i1; fli fficult to understand how conrts (the very
tribunals, to snstrtin which gO"\-ernments nre organized
ancl levy taxes), while protecting the power of police aucl
eminent clomnin, yet can hold tha.t the Legislature may
forever deprive the goYernment of this essential power
of taxation. The only reason a::i::iignecl , is tha.t of a consicleration ; that the public have received a consideration for the exemption, aud are therefore bound by the
action of the Legislature, even though it is a. contract
to commit partial suicide. If the Legi::;lnture have no
right to give away the people's sovereignty, it is nifficult to see how they can sell it. The taking a price
cannot invest the surrender with greater solemnity or
gren.ter va.liclity.
lf the element ot consideration is whnt gives the
authority to yiel<l up the taxing power, the same element woulc1 justify n surrender of other powers. A
corporntion or individua1 could as ea::iily pay a price
for immunity from the police or eminent rlo:nain. The
consi<leration. however, would receive no consideration
when the emergency :i.rose requiring the exercise of
the power. In t.he minst cf a. raging fire, threatening
the destruction of this whole city, the blowing up of
buildings to stay the progress of the flames would not
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be long delayed by the fact that, the owner had pn.irl a.
price for immunity. In the midst of wa.r, or inva::;ion
by the public enemy, the protest of the M:iine Central
against the use of its property and road to trn,nsport
troops and munitions, woulcl be little heerled, no nrntter
ho,v high a price she had p<tic1 for exemption from
eminent rlomain. w· ere an.v person. however powerful. indictecl iu thi~ court for an offense n.gain~r. the
laws, his plea of immunity. grn.ute<1 him for tL price
pn,iCI, would be most :;;ummaril.v overruled. Were thi:-:
corporn.tion brought into thi8 comt upon the snit of any
citi%en, however humble. it:;; plea of immunity from the
process of the court, though g ranter! for a, price, woul1l
only receive the imlignant rebuke of the jurlgt>s.
The State itseJf ha:-:: here come into court., anrl demands of this corporation that it contrihnte it::i fail'
share towanl tlrnt revenue without which, State, Uomt
and corporation must all peri~h together. Yet., here
the corpotation pleads immnnity pnrchase<l for a price.
'£he plea ought to be in~tantly ovcrrnlerl. Sovereignty
is beyoud price.
When, a few years ago. the Sh1th of Persia contracted
to loa.se the roya 1 revenue~ oE his kingdom to n.n English ca.pita.list, t.l1ough on strictly c:>mmerc ial principles,
and for what seemecl an a<leq uate con::;iclera,tion, the
sta.tesmen n.ncl lawyers of Europe were astoni::;herl that
even an eastern despot i:ihonlcl assume to so dispose of
the people of his rea.lm. It mu::;t hn.ve been tha.t the
Shah hn.d heard of ·some contracti2 of American L egislatures, and some decisions of A.mericau courts.
(i

I invoke another principle,-that taxation must be
equal-that, every one must pay his fair share of the
public revenues. The Legislature may determine the
mocle-mny tipecify the objects-but it can only clo
this Ly genera] h:nv:; applicable to all objects oI the
class. It cannot tax A's property, n.ncl exempt B's
property. for the exemption of B's adcls just so much
to the burden of A. It cannot exempt anybody's
property, for such exemption h1creases so mucb the
blU'clen of all the othen:. This was the underlying
principle in that mo:'>t righteous decision of this court,
in the Brewer tax ca,se, 62 Me., 62. Judge Appleton
said. in the opinion,"' Exemption from taxation includes
"the imposition of taxes. To the precise exteut tlmt
" one man'H cstat<.' is e:s:emptccl from taxation, to the
"same extent is there ttn imposition of the amount
'•exempted upon tile rest of the inhabitants." The
Legi:;Jature may exempt all frnnchisel', until they see
:fit to impose a tax, but they cnnnot exempt the franchise of the Mn.ine Centrnl n.ml tnx the franchiRe of the
Portland, ~aco a.ml Portsmouth. The exemption of
the Maine Centrn.l increases the tax Llpou the P. I:). and
P.-a proceeding tlw.t is wrong, despotic, and never to
be endmed.
1 am not alone iu venturing to urge the error of
these n.uc)malous decisions. In the Ohio Bank cases, in
the 16 I-Iowa.rel, a third of the Juclges most. unqualifiedly and empha.LicaJly dis:::ented. Judges Catrnn and
Ca.mpbeU put on record able and earnest prntests against
so pernicious a. doctrine. If in subseq ueut cases there
was no e:xpresRed dissent, it is well understood that it

was not. because none exi::;te11. 'rhese <lisseuting opinions are to my mind unanswera.b1e arguments which T
beg this court to reac1.
Perhaps at the time of the fin;t decisions neither the
courts nor the people anticiprtte<l the immense corn;eqneuces. With the enormous increase in tbe number
anc1 wealth of corpora.tions, the:-;e evi l consequences lrn.v c
become more apparent mid more acutely .felt, nntil there
is now among the people n. wicle sprcac1 conviction that
the doctrines n.re wrong and should be ftbn.ndone<l . T he
Legislature of this State have expresHed that conviction
in the Act of 187 4. 'f'he Legislatures of othel' States.
I am told, have voiced the same sentiments in their
constituents. 'rhe same conviction is growiug among
tb~ profe:-;sion. No where do we fincl the cloctrines
defended, hnt only resting on the stm·e decisis . T wo
elaborn.te :111rl convincing argument..., against them hn.ve
appeared in the Law Journal:-;, one in the Amel'ican
L aw Review for Jan1u1ry, 1873, and one now in course
of publicatiou in Lhe Southern L aw H.eview, two parts
having appeared in the April m1rl July numbe r.
Also an article in the number for October, 1875. l
would wish to make them a part of this ttrgument, bnt
I feel sure they will be re:tcl hy the members of the
court. No matter how often the tiupreme Conrt of
the United States mrty slty that the question is not.
open, dissent, like Banquo's ghost, will not down. But
even that Supreme Court ha,s felt t.lrn impulse of this
spfrit among the people.
As late as 1869, in the case Washington University
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against Rouse, 8 Wallace, 489, the CJhief Justice, anc.1
J ndges }J illcr and Fie1il. three of the eight judges of
the United Stalei::. Supreme Conrt, dis::>cnt from the
doctrine, an<l close their ahle opinion with these words:
"With as foll l'espect for the authority of former <lecisiom:; as helongi'l from tc:wliing: :rnrl ha.hit to jnclges
trainecl in the common law f'_r:->tem of jurisprn<lence.
we think t.here may be questions touching the powers
of legislative boclies, which ran never be finally closed
by the ck:cisions of a court ; and that the one we have
consirlcrccl (the s111Temlcr of taxation) is of this character. We nre strengthened in this Yiew of the subject. h_y the fact that :i series of dis~ent from this doctrine. by some of our predecessors, Hhows it has neve1·
receiYed the full a:ssent of this court; and referring to
tho:;c clissents for more elaborate defense o( our views,
we content our::;clve::> with thus renewing the protest
against a, doctrine which we think must be finally
abanclonccl. ''

Public attention has been cxciterl on this question all
over the country. It is everywhere felt that doctrines
so dangerous to the :-;tnte, so anomalous and unrepublican. mHst, Roonet· or later. be judicially conclemned,
and the rights of the people again as~ertecl. When I
look upon the Great ~eal of our :::>tate, and beholrl there
its bright motto, I h:we the proucl hope that our court
may luwe the distinguished honor to lead in tJw way
to so glorious a consummation.
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Berry, Pr.
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